I spend my first year of my doctorate mostly reading about different literature which I felt could be applicable to my future work. As well as drafted a couple of models, here I summarize and link to the works.

In game theory I mostly went through the textbook, some correlated equilibrium literature, and some heuristic literature. I hope to use this to come up with communication equilibrium in industrial organization.

The bounded rationality literature I’ve read about is mostly with the goal of deriving demand functions that behave irregularly without necessarily having irrational consumers. The most applicable literature here is that of inertia; where consumers have a barrier to switching. This literature had to be complemented with some probability and graph theory.

The industrial organization literature is mostly around patents, bundling, and innovation. These will be the main workhorse models I will be using.

Game theory Read

Aumann, Robert J., and Sergiu Hart. "Long Cheap Talk." *Econometrica* 71.6 (2003): 1619-660. Web.

Banerjee, A. V. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 107.3 (1992): 797-817. Web.

Bikhchandani, Sushil, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch. "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades." *Journal of Political Economy* 100.5 (1992): 992-1026. Web.

Ellison, Glenn, and Drew Fudenberg. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning." *Journal of Political Economy* 101.4 (1993): 612-43. Web.

Osborne, Martin J., and Ariel Rubinstein. *A Course in Game Theory*. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1994. Print.

Bounded Rationality Read

Piccione, M., and R. Spiegler. "Price Competition Under Limited Comparability." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 127.1 (2012): 97-135. Web.

Spiegler, Ran. *Bounded Rationality and Industrial Organization*. New York: Oxford UP, 2011. Print.

Spiegler, Ran. "The Market for Quacks." *Review of Economic Studies Rev Econ Studies* 73.4 (2006): 1113-131. Web.

Probability Books Read

Papoulis, Athanasios. *Probability, Random Variables, and Stochastic Processes*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. Print.

Industrial Organization and Patents

Anton, James, and Dennis Yao. "Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights." *The American Economic Review* 84.1 (1994): 190-209. Web.

Bessen, James E., and Eric S. Maskin. "Sequential Innovation, Patents, And Imitation." *SSRN Electronic Journal SSRN Journal* (n.d.): n. pag. Web.

Brynjolfsson, Erik, Yannis Bakos, and Douglas Lichtman. "The Journal of Law and Economics."*Shared Information Goods: : Vol 42, No 1*. N.p., Aug. 1998. Web. 01 June 2016.

Hopenhayn, Hugo A., and Matthew F. Mitchell. "Innovation Variety and Patent Breadth." *The RAND Journal of Economics* 32.1 (2001): 152. Web.

Llanes, Gaston, and Ramiro De Elejalde. "Industry Equilibrium with Open Source and Proprietary Firms." *SSRN Electronic Journal SSRN Journal* (n.d.): n. pag. Web.

Mosel, Malte. "Big Patents, Small Secrets: How Firms Protect Inventions When R&D Outcome Is Heterogeneous." *Big Patents, Small Secrets: How Firms Protect Inventions When R&D Outcome Is Heterogeneous*. BGPE, Sept. 2011. Web. 01 June 2016.

Varian, Hal R. "Buying, Sharing and Renting Information Goods." *The Journal of Industrial Economics* 48.4 (2003): 473-88. Web.

Varian, Hal R. "Economics of Information Technology." *Economics of Information Technology*. University of California, Berkeley, 23 Mar. 2003. Web. 01 June 2016.